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TWO THEORIES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Alden .D. Miller* 
A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE. By Jan Gorecki. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 1979. Pp. xv, 185. $15. 
A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE. By Hyman Gross. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 1979. Pp. xviii, 521. $6. 
Both Jan Gorecki1 and Hyman Gross2 see criminal justice- the 
criminal law as applied by the police, courts, and prisons - as the 
product of a society acting out of consensus to guard its integrity. 
They disagree, however, as to the ideal role of criminal justice. Pro-
fessor Gorecki calls it moral education. Professor Gross sees it as the 
exacting of a fair market price for any violation of the rules. While 
the writers understand that law does not always follow their ideals of 
criminal justice, they nevertheless regard their ideals as practical 
guides to action rather than as descriptions of Utopia. 
I. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AS MORAL EDUCATION 
Professor Gorecki believes criminal justice to be the most impor-
tant determinant of criminal behavior (p. xiii). He complains that 
people who try to solve the problem of crime by discovering and 
eradicating its social causes overlook this importance. Even those 
people who understand the importance of criminal justice misunder-
stand its functions to be incapacitation, rehabilitation, and general 
deterrence by fear. While Gorecki sees merit in these functions of 
punishment, he insists that its greatest value lies in its potential for 
moral education. He believes that a properly constructed criminal 
justice system will create moral aversion to wrongdoing, and thus 
transform prohibitions into moral norms. Only in this way, he says, 
can a civilized society control crime (p. xiv). 
Gorecki believes that fear is an inadequate deterrent to crime 
both because it is a less admirable motivation than morality and be-
cause it fails to discourage uncalculated crimes. Gorecki argues that 
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moral feelings are real and that they flourish in a stable, free society. 
Moreover, he asserts that a severe moral aversion will operate even 
in the heat of passion, and will deter crimes even when there is no 
threat of retribution. Gorecki would bring about the desired aver-
sions by arranging punishments according to psychological learning 
theory. 
Gorecki cites two fundamental mechanisms of learning to ex-
plain where moral evaluations come from: We can experience the 
consequences of our own actions, and come to associate those conse-
quences with the actions, or we can observe other people's exper-
iences and the consequences that follow from their actions. In either 
case, we come to feel as good or as bad about the actions as we do 
about their consequences (pp. 10-13). 
What if the consequences of an action are variable, sometimes 
rewarding and sometimes not? Intermittent reward leads to more 
persistent occurrence of the behavior, just as the occasional pay-offs 
of a slot machine encourage persistent gambling. The actor, know-
ing he will get a reward eventually though not every time, persists. 
Intermittent punishment, on the other hand, does not eradicate the 
behavior. The times when there are no punishments are perceived as 
times of reward; intermittent punishment is thus intermittent reward 
and the behavior becomes entrenched (pp. 14-15). 
While it might therefore seem more productive to attempt to in-
fluence human behavior through rewards rather than punishments, 
Gorecki's concern is with the criminal law. He chooses punishment 
as a device for promoting moral learning. Obviously, to work, pun-
ishment must follow nearly every occurrence of the proscribed be-
havior. This is how Gorecki comes to the time-honored conclusion 
that criminal sanctions must be a certain consequence of criminal 
behavior if the criminal law is to be an effective deterrent. To this 
basic argument Gorecki adds one major element. To be moral, as 
opposed to just plain powerful, the law must be just. To _be just, the 
law must be applied equally to all persons and it must conform with 
what most people in the society think is "right." To conform with 
what people think is right, the law must match their moral exper-
iences. Thus, there can be justice only when the moral experiences 
of the people converge sufficiently to produce in the society a con-
sensus about moral evaluations. Just law must therefore be consis-
tently applied in conformity with the moral consensus of society 
(p. 21). 
Armed with this conception of how the criminal law could be an 
instrument of moral education, Gorecki turns to the American crimi-
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nal justice system. He finds three things wrong with it. First, it con-
tains laws that proscribe activities about which there is no moral 
consensus, such as homosexuality and drug abuse. Second, judges 
apply the law inconsistently, and both plea bargaining and the in-
determinant sentence have institutionalized inconsistency. Finally, 
the system fails to provide certainty: officials fail to punish every 
violation, 3 and constitutional constraints such as the exclusionary 
rule offer the guilty a hope of going scot-free. 
What should be done? Gorecki considers first the two classes of 
crimes that should not be crimes because they do not reflect a moral 
consensus. The first class, including crimes such as homosexuality, 
should simply be taken off the books, because doing so would re-
move injustice without risking any harm (p. 95). Of course, not 
everyone will be as convinced as Gorecki is that society will reach 
this view as a consensus in the near future. The other class of crimes 
that should not be crimes includes offenses like drug abuse that are 
too complicated to prevent through criminal sanctions. Gorecki con-
siders drug abuse an unjust crime because the addict is powerless not 
to be an addict. Nevertheless, Gorecki thinks the use of narcotics 
should be supervised, and he will not accept a need to maintain a 
drug habit as an excuse for street crime. Therefore a legislature can-
not simply abolish drug-abuse laws and consider its work done. It 
should provide a cheap, or even free, supply of drugs to persons 
whom appropriate authorities certify as addicts. It should also ag-
gressively root out the black market in drugs, so as to prevent the 
, creation of new addicts. The sellers alone should be punished (pp. 
96-101). 
Much more important to Gorecki than decriminalization of un-
just crimes is the eradication of sweeping judicial discretion and plea 
bargaining (p. 103). He would impose criminal sanctions on police 
who fail to enforce all laws, and on prosecutors who fail to prosecute 
all cases where conviction is likely. He would limit the discretion of 
judges as well, supervising sentencing with an appeals mechanism 
that could increase or decrease manifestly inappropriate sentences. 
We should retain some judicial discretion, Gorecki argues, because 
to fix sentences without consideration of mitigating and aggravating 
factors would be unjust. But the judge would have to state specific 
reasons for the sentence so the defendant would know whether to 
appeal. Finally, Gorecki would limit discretion by eliminating plea 
3. Many policymakers have become committed to rooting out the social causes of crime or 
to treating rather than punishing violators; Gorecki considers both goals impractical. Pp. 69-
81. 
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bargaining, which he sees as vitiating the law as an instrument of 
moral education because it results in punishment that is unrelated to 
the actual crime (pp. 103-09). 
Gorecki recognizes that his reforms might swamp the system 
with far more cases than it can handle. He reassures us that we can 
avoid this by eliminating unjust laws and relying more on fines in-
stead of imprisonment to punish some crimes. He would impose 
draconian penalties only where a consensus of society clearly sup-
ported it (pp. I 09-11 ). However, even the "real" crimes would over-
whelm the system unless it were streamlined. Gorecki recommends 
such things as consolidation of police departments and improvement 
of recruiting and training, use of summary punishments for minor 
crimes, coordination of prosecutors' functions within states, centrali-
zation of state court systems and the adoption of modem manage-
ment methods, elimination of pretrial detention except where the 
defendant would commit more crimes or hinder gathering of evi-
dence, broader use of depositions, expedition of filing and hearing of 
motions, and creation of a "single, swift post conviction remedy for 
infringements of constitutional rights" (p. 112). 
Gorecki's most controversial proposals are the elimination of ju-
ries and the use of means other than plea bargaining to induce con-
fessions. Gorecki would not object to the time-consuming and costly 
use of juries if society were willing to pay for them in all trials. But 
the present system, he complains, offers perfect justice for only the 
five percent of defendants that get jury trials, and a travesty of justice 
for the ninety-five percent that plea bargain. Why not consider good 
justice - bench trials - for everyone, he asks (pp. 112-15). 
Gorecki's approach to confessions may be the most controversial 
point in his proposal, and he is unyielding about it. Gorecki insists 
that the police must be able to elicit confessions iflaw enforcement is 
to be certain. He argues that police cannot elicit confessions unless 
they can interrogate the suspect without a lawyer present (since a 
good lawyer would advise him not to talk) and tell the suspect (truth-
fully) that if he refuses to talk they may mention that fact in court. 
All this was possible before Miranda v. Arizona4 and other Supreme 
Court decisions of the sixties (pp. 81-89). Gorecki suggests that we 
reconsider Miranda by making explicit its underlying values, and 
then :find other ways to provide for them. Gorecki points out that 
the majority of commentators believe that Miranda does not safe-
guard the privilege against self-incrimination as a value in itself but 
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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rather it serves other values: "protecting the innocent, ensuring pro-
cedural fairness, maintaining equality, and protecting society from 
unjust law" (p. 118). 
Gorecki has no quarrel with protecting the innocent, but he is 
less generous about the other three arguments. He notes that the 
Supreme Court has construed the prohibition against unfair prac-
tices very broadly, even to include things that may happen by acci-
dent in the course of any effective investigation. He returns to his 
earlier argument that moral evaluations reflect the needs of the soci-
ety, and suggests that the needs of the society (to convict criminals) 
require a narrower exclusion. Gorecki criticizes the equality argu-
ment on two grounds: its advocates wrongly assume that only the 
poor do not know of their right to keep silent; and they are wrong in 
suggesting that society is obligated to teach all criminals to be as 
smart about their rights as some of them already are. As for the need 
to protect citizens from unjust law, Gorecki maintains simply that in 
a democratic society most laws will be just, and that it would be 
absurd to cripple the entire criminal justice system because of the 
few exceptions. 
The solution, to Gorecki, seems simple. The Supreme Court re-
stricted confessions in Miranda only after calls for legislation fell on 
deaf ears; thus, proper legislation would eliminate the need for the 
Miranda protections. Gorecki feels the state should simply require 
electronic surveillance of police interrogation rooms, and unan-
nounced visits to those rooms by specially trained judicial officers. 
The police then could dispense with the Miranda warnings, the sus-
pect' s lawyer could be barred from the interrogation, and the interro-
gators could warn the suspect that they would inform the jury about 
his refusal to talk (pp. 122-26). 
Gorecki's point is that the Miranda rights were not values in and 
of themselves, but a second choice means to prevent the police from 
resorting to physical and mental torture. Since he is providing for a 
way to keep tabs on those abuses, and since he believes lesser forms 
of police pressure to be justified by necessity, he is happy with this 
solution. 
Gorecki realizes that many people are horrified at his proposals. 
They object that such a system would "wreck the lives of a large 
proportion of lawbreakers" (p. 128). Gorecki points out, however, 
that sentences sufficient to promote moral learning, unlike those nec-
essary for general deterrence by fear, need not be overly long. He 
also rejects labeling theory, which argues that prisons breed more 
crime. Though popular, the theory has never been proved, and it 
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has the moral liability of teaching the criminal to feel that those who 
condemn him, not he himself, are responsible for his wrongdoing. 
Gorecki believes this undermines the condemnation process, and 
therefore impedes moral learning (p. 131). Finally, Gorecki 
promises that the carnage will be over after the first generation of 
criminals following the reforms meet just and certain punishment. 
The moral learning thus engendered will then greatly reduce the 
number of criminals (pp. 132-33). 
IL CRIMINAL JUSTICE AS SOCIAL CRITICISM 
To Hyman Gross, criminal justice is social criticism. The law 
provides rules that must be taken seriously by the law-abiding, be-
cause they know that the law cannot be broken with impunity. That 
is, the law-abiding know that those who intentionally break the law 
will not "get away with it." Gross does not suggest for a moment 
that all law breakers will be deterred or reformed. He says that the 
point of the law is not to stamp out crime, but to reinforce the law-
abiding ways of most members of the community. 
Gross points out that for the law to function for such a purpose, it 
must distinguish between excusable and inexcusable breaking of the 
rules. Thus one can defend oneself against an accusation of wrong-
doing not only by asserting that one did not do it, but also by assert-
ing that one could not help it, or that one had a right to do it (for 
example, to save one's life). Only just and reasonable social criticism 
will encourage the law-abiding to respect the law; therefore it is only 
blameworthy breaking of the law that we should criticize (pp. 6-13). 
In admitting that criminal justice cannot completely stamp out 
crime, Professor Gross is much less ambitious in his goals for crimi-
nal justice than Professor Gorecki. His book is also more narrowly 
focused - it is devoted mainly to clarifying the principles of the law 
itself, with relatively little discussion of the processing system. 
Gorecki, by contrast, devoted more of his discussion to the process-
ing issues. The distinction is not as great as it might seem, however, 
because in both cases the authors' conceptions of proper processing 
flow from their conceptions of the nature and purpose of the law. 
Like Gorecki, Gross begins by arguing the inadequacy of alter-
native approaches. Gross and Gorecki agree that removal and cor-
rection are not the law's primary functions, but they disagree about 
moral criticism. Gross argues that while most illegal acts are also 
moral wrongs, the law condemns these acts for reasons other than 
that they are immoral. This is shown by the fact that there are many 
immoral acts that the law takes no notice of, and many of these are 
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more immoral than those the law does take notice of, although they 
are not likely to be as harmful. Moreover, some crimes are moral 
wrongs only because they are violations of a rule and the person :who 
violates the rules takes unfair advantage of those who comply. Such 
laws were not made to correct moral wrongs. Finally, the severity of 
punishment a law calls for does not correlate with moral gravity of 
its violation (pp. 16-17). 
Gross's objection to the criminal law as a way of removing or 
treating dangerous persons is that the commission of a crime is a 
poor way of identifying dangerous people (p. 35). He points out fur-
ther that, to the extent that we know how to identify seriously dan-
gerous people, civil commitment is a more appropriate mechanism 
for removing them from society (p. 45). 
Gross then turns to working out his own view in more detail. He 
first clarifies what a criminal act is. Both the common law and the 
Model Penal Code de.fine a criminal act as a set of bodily movements 
accompanied by a mental state; only the coincidence of these two 
elements results in criminal liability (p. 49). Gross finds this unsatis-
factory because it means that liability depends upon whether the per-
son "meant it." Instead of entering this murky psychological 
territory, Gross argues that a criminal act is conduct - not necessar-
ily a distinguishable set of bodily movements - that is culpable. It 
is culpable only if it is done intentionally, brings harm, is dangerous, 
and is not legitimate (pp. 77-81). An act is intentional, Gross says, 
not when accompanied by a particular mental state, but if the actor 
exercises control over it (p. 89). Harm is an "untoward occurrence 
consisting in a violation of some interest of a person" (p. 115). A 
violation of interest includes, of course, attempts to shoot at some-
one, whether or not the bullet went true. Dangerousness is the de-
gree to which the actor should reasonably have expected harm to 
occur (p. 80). Harmful conduct is legitimate if the interests served by 
the conduct outweigh the interests that are violated by it (p. 80). The 
interest served could be anything from saving one's life to perform-
ance of an official duty to promoting the interests of society. Along 
these four dimensions, any two acts can be compared and contrasted, 
and relative criminal liability can be assessed. 
Gross devotes a sizable portion of his book to excuses and justifi-
cations, which he collectively calls exculpatory claims. They of 
course tum on the four dimensions, and the discussion of how one 
escapes culpability does much to illuminate the four dimensions 
themselves. 
In the final few chapters of the book, Gross turns explicitly to 
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what his theory means for the criminal justice system, and why we 
impose liability in the first place. After considering alternative views 
of the purpose of criminal penalties, he restates his own view: that 
criminal law and punishment protect society from disintegration by 
maintaining respect for its rules. What is essential is that all persons 
know that those who break the law do not get away with it. The 
criminal law is not expected to deter all crime, but it does serve to 
discourage most citizens from breaking society's rules. 
Gross's justification for punishment explains why he examines 
the idea of culpability in such great detail: respect for the law is 
fostered only when we punish all - and only - culpable conduct. 
Either the punishment of inculpable acts or the tolerance of culpable 
ones would be disastrous in this respect. It follows that there must 
be no. plea bargaining and no overly harsh or overly lenient 
sentences. 
Still, condemnation does not mean that prison conditions should 
be cruel. To the contrary, if barbarous punishment offends people's 
sense of justice it will only cause disrespect for the law. Gross points 
out, in fact, that even if we believe that it is morally right to make 
prisoners miserable in retribution for what they have done, the state 
has no right to pursue such moral aims; it is limited by the purpose 
of punishment, which is condemnation, a change of status. Realisti-
cally, we need not fear that prisons will become attractive places to 
be, says Gross, because the law-abiding find the idea of going to 
prison quite terrible. It is irrelevant whether criminals find it attrac-
tive, since the law is not designed to aff e_ct them anyway (pp. 461-63). 
Gross does not believe, however, that prison officials should pro-
vide therapy (beyond education and the opportunity for good health 
and social relations); just as the state has no right to pursue moral 
crusades through punishment, so it has no right to pursue them 
through treatment. The criminal justice system is not concerned 
with taking people apart and remaking them. Gross points out that 
it is just plain empirically wrong to assume that because people have 
violated the law they have something "wrong with them." The law 
is concerned with acts. A criminal act does not reveal at all accu-
rately what kind of person the actor is. The state should, however, 
provide treatment when the need for it is established independently, 
whether the malady be physical or mental (p. 476). 
III. How MANY PROPOSALS? 
Gorecki and Gross represent their theories as very different, and 
indeed upon first impression their ideal justice systems do appear to 
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be very _different. One believes that by inculcating moral aversions 
in all citizens we can eradicate even crimes of passion. The other 
says outright that the justice system can have no effect on those who 
are not already committed to obey the law; it serves only to maintain 
the respect of the law-abiding. 
But what are the essential features of the systems the writers pro-
pose? For both writers the justice system must condemn every crimi-
nal act in exact proportion to its culpability, no more and no less. 
The system must never let a single crime go unpunished, nor can it 
punish a single innocent person. Both writers think other ap-
proaches, such as treatment, simply do not work, and they are un-
willing to impose therapy upon the convicted. Incarceration's only 
function is condemnation of the crime. 
Even Gorecki's and Grass's apparent disagreement about the re-
lation of law to morality evaporates when we look to their specific 
proposals. Gorecki believes that the main purpose of a criminal jus-
tice system is moral education. Gross says that the law will do vio-
lence to legitimate dissent if it tries to be an enforcer of morality (p. 
32). This difference is one of terminology rather than substance, 
however. The "morality" that Gross distinguishes from law is the set 
of norms about which there is no broad consensus. And Gorecki 
would agree that these norms should not be legally prescribed. The 
two writers use different language to argue for the same position: 
that the justice system should enforce only norms that are founded 
on a broad consensus. 
Thus, for most practical purposes, Gorecki and Gross propose 
the same justice system. But they disagree dramatically on what that 
justice system will accomplish. The two books are two dramatically 
different advertisements by two different horse sellers. Yet when we 
look at the teeth, the horse is the same. In view of the conflicting 
advertisements, perhaps we need some additional opinions about the 
horse. 
Before turning to that, however, let us look briefly at one claim 
that both advertisers make: all other models for the justice system, 
they assert, are inadequate. In particular, both Gorecki and Gross 
are rather quick to dismiss attempts to help criminals, in part on the 
ground that such attempts cannot succeed. The evidence far from 
unequivocally supports that view. Most of the published studies of 
what works in corrections simply evaluate conventional therapies 
designed to rehabilitate individuals without interfering very much in 
their situation in the community. Yet since even the most innovative 
programs generally do not go far enough on a large enough scale to 
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indicate the true potential of the treatment approach, Gorecki and 
Gross are wrong to conclude all attempts to rehabilitate criminals 
must fail. 
The problem is illustrated by the attempts at youth correctional 
reform in Massachusetts during the 1970s. A recent study reports 
that the massive juvenile deinstitutionalization and community-
based correctional reforms during that decade failed to reduce the 
state's recidivism rate.5 That is the kind of study that convinces 
Gorecki and Gross that treatment does not work. Yet the same 
study isolated a factor that did affect recidivism: the kind of rela-
tional networks the youth were involved in in the community -
what kind of people they associated with, what these people did, and 
what they encouraged. 6 The study also showed that the reform pro-
grams, while making much progress, simply did not deal with the 
confederate problem for a great many of the youth.7 Thus the study, 
while showing that the reforms did not reduce the overall recidivism 
rate, also gave significant clues as to what would have worked, and 
why the reforms fell short. 
Gorecki and Gross might object that such discussion is pointless 
since the successful program has not yet been demonstrated. If that 
is so, we may as well ignore Gorecki's and Gross's work too, for their 
programs have not been demonstrated in full working order either. 
But if we wish to make progress, we cannot cavalierly dismiss any 
new ideas. There is more than one horse, and the race is not yet run. 
IV. IDEALISM AND REALITY 
In both Gorecki's and Gross's conceptions the criminal justice 
system must strictly adhere to the ideal model. Both writers believe 
that inconsistencies and lapses will result in the sense of injustice. 
For Gross that will breed disrespect for the law, and make it ineffec-
tive as a tool of social criticism. For Gorecki the injustice will rob 
the law of its moral force. Thus both men call for radical reforms in 
the present system. What are the prospects for such reforms? Both 
writers are optimistic, but neither has an empirical foundation for his 
optimism. For empirical evidence we must tum to the work of in-
vestigators who have studied how law is actually used in society and 
how changes in the law come about. 
5. R. COATES, A. MILLER & L. OHLIN, DIVERSITY IN A YOUTH CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM 
147-74 (1978). 
6. Id. at 159. 
7. Id. at 91-94. 
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An example of a concerted attempt to study empirical variations 
in the use of law is the work of Donald Black. 8 His material is con-
troversial but, being empirical, it is subject to further empirical 
study. Black has investigated when law is used in various societies. 
He defines law as governmental social control,9 and the quantity of 
law as the degree to which law is invoked.10 A complaint to a legal 
official, recognition or investigation of the complaint, hearings, ar-
rests, prosecution, surrender, decisions in favor of the plaintiff- all 
represent an invocation of the law. 11 
Black also considers what kind of people within a society are 
most likely to invoke the law. His results suggest that, at least in 
part, law is a means whereby the "in-group" - those with power -
keep the weaker outsiders in line. He finds that the superior tend to 
use law against the inferior, the more cultured tend to use law 
against the less cultured, the more conventional tend to use law 
against the unconventional, the more powerfully organized tend to 
use law against the weakly organized, and the upstanding of society 
(those who have not been subjected to social control) tend to use law 
against the deviant (the targets of earlier social control). 12 Black's 
work does not necessarily suggest that law is an illegitimate social 
institution, but it does raise questions about its justice. It suggests 
that the relationship of justice and the criminal law may be very dif-
ferent than either Gorecki or Gross supposes. Until Gorecki and 
Gross demonstrate that the empirical patterns discerned by Black 
are not inevitable we cannot be sure that their ideal systems are not 
just utopian. Utopias are not necessarily a bad thing, but they 
should be clearly labeled as such. 
If the patterns that Black found in the uses of law are not inevita-
ble, we must still ask whether changes of the magnitude that Gorecki 
and Gross propose can actually take place. The results of the study 
of youth correctional reform in Massachusetts help to answer this 
question. That study identified five empirical patterns over a twelve-
year period in the Massachusetts reform, and found evidence that 
these patterns were quite generally applicable to other types of re-
forms in other times and places: (1) To cause a widespread change 
in behavior one must simultaneously (a) facilitate the desired prac-
tices and impede the undesired ones, and (b) persuade key actors 
8. D. BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW (1976). 
9. Id at 2. 
10. See id at 3. 
ll. Id 
12. Id at 21-22, 65, 69, 92, 113-14. 
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that they would like to do the desired things and not the undesired 
things. A combination of coercion and persuasion is necessary. (2) 
To make it possible to develop new patterns one must overcome the 
great inertia of the existing ways of doing things. The most effective 
means are scandal, public investigation, and expose. (3) It is impor-
tant for reformers to get the formal decision makers on the side of 
change. These are the people who may not have much interest in the 
issues but who are very concerned with their prerogatives as decision 
makers. ( 4) Issue-oriented groups that favor and oppose reform 
tend to relax their efforts when they seem to be succeeding, thus be-
coming more' vulnerable to attack, and to resort to extreme tactics 
when they get desperate, thus alienating their allies among the for-
mal decision makers. (5) Extreme tactics frequently succeed in the 
short run but, since they leave the reformers with fewer allies, even-
tually lead to defeat. The defeat often follows after the reforms ap-
pear to be in place and functioning. The reformers may not clearly 
perceive that their earlier extreme tactics led to the final failure. 13 
These patterns portray a never-ending struggle. No one is right 
all the time. Temporary victories produce only shifting consensuses. 
There is little opportunity for the fine tuning that Gorecki and Gross 
call for. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
The literature of the Victorian Age began with the notion that 
there was truth, light, goodness, and understanding, and that life was 
a quest to find them. The age concluded in some disillusionment, 
with a feeling that the meaning of life was in the quest itself, not in 
the achievement of any imagined goal. Such disillusionment is per-
haps not so terrible. In the Massachusetts reform the best time for 
the youth was probably during the height of the process of reform, 
rather than after the reforms were in place. It was during the strug-
gle that everyone was paying the most attention to the children. And 
the children thrived on that. 
Similarly, perhaps the importance of Gorecki's and Gross's 
books will be not in the solutions they propose, but in the contro-
versy they provoke. That controversy may excite concern for what 
actually happens to real, live, human beings, both victims and of-
fenders. The human beings would thrive on that. 
13. See A. MlLLER, L. OHLIN & R. COATES, A THEORY OF SOCIAL REFORM 41-45 (1977). 
